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such an atmosphere and thus become the first victim of the Tragedy 
of the Commons. 
The novus ordo sec/arum that the founders founded was new 
precisely in that it expected people to behave self-interestedly. Un-
like older political systems that had aimed at the perfection of 
human nature ("laws make men better"), the American system was 
designed to frustrate zealotry through what we should call sublima-
tion. Commerce, not Christianity, was to be the established all-
American religion. In Europe, the dominant fact of political life for 
hundreds of years had been sectarian conflict-poor, nasty, brutish, 
and long. Our Constitution would turn loose this fertile source of 
libidinal energy on a nobler objective than the honor of God or the 
salvation of the soul, namely, getting rich. 
Whether or not historians of the Federalist period will be per-
suaded by this interpretation of events, the worthiness of Berns's 
vision cannot be denied. A world in which commercial competition 
replaces religious strife has everything to be said for it. Wise gover-
nors will, if they have the wits, create a civic environment in which 
people may behave "naturally"-as human beings, not angels-and 
yet at the same time constructively. This is the great consequential-
ist argument for property rights. 
A review can seldom do justice to a serious book, and I fear 
having judged Berns's very serious book too harshly. Much of my 
criticism probably boils down to the different perspectives that law-
yers and political theorists have of the subject. Unlike most law-
yers, Berns is concerned less with the problem of interpretation 
than with understanding larger questions of democracy. It is re-
freshing to get these crosslights on a Constitution that is equally the 
property of all serious people and, to our good fortune, our funda-
mental law as well. 
RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By Mark Tushnet.t Cambridge: 
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Professor Mark Tushnet is one of the most prolific and articu-
late critics-from the left-of mainstream constitutional theory. 
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This book is an ambitious effort to integrate and expand his critique 
of modern constitutional scholarship. The book is divided into two 
parts. In Part I Professor Tushnet appraises the major competing 
"grand theories" of constitutional law; in Part II, which draws on 
the currently fashionable theory of "classical republicanism," he 
analyzes a series of specific doctrinal problems. 
As Tushnet acknowledges, few of the insights in Part I are 
new. By contrast, much of Part II is extremely interesting; his dis-
cussion of the Court's approach to procedural due process is partic-
ularly enlightening. The difficulty with Part II is that the analysis 
would apply equally well to similar policy decisions adopted by the 
legislature on the same issues; Tushnet fails to address institutional 
concerns generated by the fact that the judiciary is imposing the 
relevant standards. 
In a sense this criticism is unfair; Tushnet purports only to be 
treating the doctrinal developments "as a social phenomenon, the 
expression of a technocratic vision of society." But a plausible anal-
ysis of constitutional doctrine must go beyond the simple question 
of whether the doctrine is "good" in the abstract; it must also ask 
whether the federal judiciary should impose that doctrine in the 
face of contrary decisions by other branches of government. 
Tushnet's answer seems to be that courts are simply another locus 
of political power, whose actions are to be judged by the same crite-
ria that apply to other governmental bodies. This argument in turn 
is a natural outgrowth of his critique of grand theory in Part I. 
Either implicitly or explicitly, Tushnet's critique raises three 
basic, interrelated issues. 
1. Why is Grand Theory of Interest? 
The first key question is whether a grand theory of constitu-
tional adjudication is necessary. Tushnet claims that the current 
interest in grand theory "reflects, indeed is the reflection of, the cri-
sis of contemporary liberal political theory." In fact, however, the 
basic idea of a grand theory addresses more general concerns. The 
Constitution is invoked as a device to allow judges to avoid the nor-
mal operation of legal conventions. The competing convention 
most often discussed is that judges are required to follow the stat-
utes adopted by the legislature. One possible approach would be to 
allow judges to ignore all statutes that they believe unjust; at the 
other extreme, we might require judges to enforce all statutes of 
whatever character. To my knowledge, neither Tushnet nor any 
other American legal scholar seriously advocates either of these ex-
treme positions. (Even the most "realistic" of realists will want the 
Court to eschew some just causes, if only to preserve its time.) The 
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only remaining alternative is to allow or require judges to ignore 
statutes under a limited set of conditions. A theory of constitu-
tional law is simply a description and explanation of those condi-
tions; if it purports to cover a wide range of circumstances it is, in 
Tushnet's lexicon, a "grand theory." 
Viewed from this perspective, grand theory responds to con-
cerns that transcend liberal political theory. Of course, the content 
of particular grand theories may reflect the concerns of liberalism, 
republicanism, Marxism, or some other political philosophy. But to 
associate the general idea of constitutional theory with any particu-
lar school of political thought only confuses the basic problem of 
the relationship between the courts and other power centers in 
society. 
2. Is Construction of a Coherent, Useful Grand Theory 
Possible? 
Tushnet suggests that the answer is no. He posits the following 
test for constitutional theories: 
[D]etermine the best and worst politically feasible outcomes you can imagine from 
legislatures following the time that you are applying the theory. An approach to 
constitutional law ... is indefensible if it would allow judges to uphold the worst 
and invalidate the best politically feasible programs that legislatures are likely to 
devise in the near future. 
Although I do not agree with Tushnet on this point,J I will concede 
arguendo that none of the currently popular constitutional theories 
passes this test. It does not follow, however, that no coherent, use-
ful grand theory can be constructed. 
Consider an approach which might be labeled the "minimal 
representation" theory. This theory would consist of two simple 
rules. First, courts would require all legislative decisionmakers to 
be selected according to the principle of one person, one vote. Sec-
ond, courts would enforce all statutes adopted by legislatures so 
constituted-irrespective of contrary constitutional provisions. 
The minimal representation approach would not be my first 
choice as a grand theory of constitutional adjudication. Nonethe-
less, it clearly passes Tushnet's test for grand theories. Following 
minimal representation analysis, the courts would not invalidate the 
best politically feasible program that is likely to be adopted in the 
near future (unless one's favorite program is one that requires legis-
latures to be malapportioned). Moreover, the theory would obvi-
ously have important consequences for the structure of American 
3. See Maltz. Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism. 1987 UTAH L. Rrv. 773. 
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government. As this example demonstrates, construction of a co-
herent, useful, grand theory is possible. 
3. Is Construction of an Uncontroversial Grand Theory 
Possible? 
Here the answer must be no. Any grand theory will reflect 
fundamental premises about the proper role of government and the 
appropriate function of courts. These premises are likely to be con-
troversial; moreover, as premises, they are not susceptible to logical 
proof. Therefore, the grand theories generated by the premises will 
inevitably be controversial as well. 
Here again, the minimal representation theory provides an in-
structive example. The theory rests on two premises. First, that 
effectuating the decisions of a properly chosen legislature is invaria-
bly of paramount importance to the legal system. And second, that 
even in the absence of an explicit constitutional mandate, the courts 
are the appropriate agency to police the legislative selection process. 
Nearly everyone rejects the first premise; some, including most 
originalists, disagree with the second. Thus we would all reject the 
minimal representation theory. Because our reasons involve basic 
premises, however, none of us would be demonstrably either right 
or wrong in doing so. 
* * * * 
Although Tushnet fails in his effort to totally discredit the 
search for grand theories of constitutional law, his analysis contains 
important lessons for those who would construct such theories. 
Grand theorists must be more precise, both in specifying their 
premises and describing the content of the theories themselves. 
Such precision will not end the debate over the theories; it will, 
however, at least make clear what the debate is about. 
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Professor Raoul Berger says he came reluctantly to his advo-
cacy of states' rights. He was somewhat embarrassed by the com-
pany he had to keep, for he had long associated the doctrine with 
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